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From the early 197Os, the problems of food shortage reached an 
alarming state, necessitating more serious attention from both govern-
ments and individuals. In the case of the former, these responses have 
been numerous and varied, ranging from short- to long-term measures, from 
importing food to make up for the shortfall, to laying the necessary 
infrastructure for higher output in agriculture. Prominent and most 
important among the imported foodstuffs have been cereals, especially 
rice. This paper is therefore an attempt to assess the success or failure 
of the measures taken by the various Nigerian governments in response to 
this crisis. 
Issues 
Before doing this, however, it is necessary to establish the case of 
shortage of cereals which constitute a high percentage of foodstuffs 
consumed in the country. To do this, the paper will examine the grain 
component of Nigeria's international trade. A rise in the import of 
grains, which is the demonstration variable of this crisis, may be a 
pointer to increasing reliance on outside sources of supply, while a 
decrease in its export may also point to decline in its domestic 
production. Trends in the import and export component of Nigeria's 
international trade can therefore tell us a lot about the problems of 
food production in the country. For this reason, the paper examines 
exports and imports of the agricultural sesctor of the economy from the 
196Os to the present. I would like to state here that although output 
from domestic sources of food supply, especially during the period of 
crisis, may show annual growth, it may not necessarily negate the fact 
that there has been a crisis. If such a growth in output is offset by 
annual population growth, there could still be a food shortage, thus 
giving rise to a crisis situation. 
After establishing the existence of this problem, the paper will 
proceed to examine the responses to this crisis situation. It should be 
pointed out here that various institutions and individuals addressed 
themselves to this situation. There have been, for example, responses 
from international organizations such as the U.N.O. in the form of relief 
and from foreign donors such as governments and organizations outside 
Nigeria. Within Nigeria, governments, private bodies, and individuals 
have similarly responded to this crisis situation in their respective 
fashion. Although these responses have come from various quarters, those 
of the home government have been more consistent, systematic, and, in 
quantitative terms, more substantial than any of the others. The 
examination of the response of this principal actor is therefore 
important because its failure or success has serious policy implications 
for future development. 
Method of Analysis 
Governments' responses from the 1960s to the present have varied from 
short-term to long-term measures. These have ranged from the importation 
of grains to top up domestic supply, to capital investment in laying 
agricultural infrastructure, such as the various river projects we shall 
later examine. There have also been responses in which the government 
considered commodity prices as the genesis of the problem of agriculture 
and food shortage. This will necessitate examining the use of price 
policy to encourage agricultural production. Other responses have been 
the creation of an agricultural loan scheme under which have come meas-
ures like the Agricultural Bank, the Agricultural Credit Guaranteed 
Scheme, and the Co-operative Union Banks. The subsidized sale of high 
breed seed, fertilizer distribution, tractors and tractor hiring schemes 
which have recently come under the administrative umbrella of the various 
river projects, and a host of other measures will be examined to deter-
mine their effectiveness in solving the food problem. 
The main emphasis of this paper is to examine the contradictions and 
weaknesses of government response to the food crisis in Nigeria. After 
examining the various steps taken by the government to solve the problems 
of food shortage, therefore, the paper shifts its emphasis to examining 
what successes have been registered, what failure has been encountered, 
and what, in the light of all these, needs to be done next. To do this, 
the paper heavily depends on statistical data of the various institutions 
assigned to address this problem in the country. It must be stated here, 
that although there is a general scepticism in accepting Nigerian govern-
ment or quasi-government statistical information among social scientists, 
the paucity of such data at our disposal nevertheless deserve a certain 
credibility when conclusions based on them are viewed as pointers to 
certain patterns rather than to ultimate ends. 
Data within this category which will be used here are those on the 
output from the various river projects. Thus, the paper examines annual 
output from the farms of the various river projects either as pilot or as 
demonstration schemes. Changes in the grain component of Nigeria import 
and export trade since the inception of the river projects may also point 
to the success, failure or need for alternative policy tools to address 
the problem. Accordingly, trade figures from the early 1970s could be 
examined for such changes. The examination of productivity figures on the 
well prepared pilot land on the river project sites might also be inform-
ative, for such may serve as a basis for a credible projection on the 
future of the river projects as a solution to Nigeria's food problem. 
Finally, it should be pointed out here that the river projects are 
capital-intensive investment with a long gestation period. The paper 
therefore does not assess the success of the projects based on whether or 
not they have solved the problem they are designed to solve, but focuses 
on the practicality and hence relevance of this approach to the issue. 
The need to question how practical the approach is, is pertinent in the 
light of the pattern of development in the agricultural sector.I Thus 
conclusions to be derived from the figures of output or purchase, which 
will be used in this instance, could only provide a credible basis for 
projection into the future of the projects and Nigeria's food problems. 
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This would naturally lead us on to examining the costs and the effi-
cient sustenance of projects in order to yield higher returns. Here the 
paper examines the construction of dams, irrigation canals, distribution 
of subsidized high yield variety of seeds, tractor hiring schemes, 
distribution of insecticides, and the government's ability to sustain 
these services or the ability of the various projects to be self-
sustaining. It also examines the social cost (political protest from 
rehabilitated people to provide land for such projects) and how the 
likely rifts and violence can be averted as a prerequisite to fruitful 
dividends. 
Another social cost which needs to be examined for its policy impli-
cation, is the emerging class of big agricultural businessmen, the van-
ishing peasantry, and the social clash likely to be caused by the result-
ant increasing disparity between the two classes. The avoidance of such a 
potential clash is no doubt necessary for the prosperity of the projects 
on which these classes feed. In particular, what can be done to resolve 
the contradiction of sweeping away rural poverty and the resulting class 
of big agribusinessmen who would emerge to dominate the scene and whose 
dominance may give rise to unhealthy relationships with other classes in 
the society? These are some of the issues the paper addresses in its 
conclusion where emphasis is on the attendant problems of the projects 
and ways and means of solving them to warrant good returns. Having made 
these few remarks and observations to explain the structure of the paper, 
let us now move on to address its subject matter by first empirically 
establishing the deficiency in the domestic supply of food and hence the 
existence of the problem of food shortage. 
Historical Development of the Problem 
In the 1960s observers commented on Nigeria's agricultural bouyancy: 
"Nigeria produces a wide variety of food crops which make the country 
largely self-sufficient in food. The major food crops produced include 
sorghum, millet, rice, maize, cowpeas, yam and cassava. The country also 
produces a wide range of fruits and vegetables, including kola, banana, 
citrus fruit, mango, pineapple, paw-paw, cashew, avocado, shea nut, beet 



















NIGERIA: PRODUCTION STATISTICS FOR FOOD CROPS 1966-1980 
IN 300 TONS 
Maize Millet Rice Wheat 
1018 4937 199 20 
988 6007 385 21 
950 5074 363 20 
1409 6650 325 20 
1299 6621 421 
938 6129 388 20 
1064 6652 447 20 
547 5361 487 15 
1215 6344 525 18 
1260 6505 515 18 
1300 6605 387 20 
1350 6760 408 21 
1480 6920 515 21 
1500 6965 600 21 
1550 7060 725 21 
Source: G. 0. I. Abalu, Agricultural Production in Sub-Sahara Africa: 
Prospects for Future, Consultative report to the FAO, November 
1983. For figures on earlier periods see the Digest of Statistics 
1964-5; and S. 0. Olayide (ed) Economic Survey of Nigeria 
1960-1975 (Ibadan, 1976), Table 3.2; see also Quarterly Economic 
Review, November 4th, 1973. 
This favorable state of agriculture in the 1960s vis-a-vis the 1970s can 
also be seen clearly in the value of the food component of Nigeria's 
imports. This grew from N43,804,000 in 1963 to N441,700,000 in 1976. Even 
though other sources present different figures, it is an established fact 
that the food import bill had reached an alarming state by the mid -
1970s. In 1981, this bill reached more than $3 billion. Since 1971, wheat 
imports alone have risen from 400,000 to 1.5 billion tonnes.3 
Table 2 
FOOD IMPORT OTHER THAN BEVERAGES AND ANIMAL AND VEGETABLE OILS AND FATS 
1963 - 1976 
Year Food Value Year Food Value 
1963 N43,804,000 1969 N41,732,000 
1964 N41,240,000 1970 N57,694,000 
1965 N46,076,000 1971 N87, 910,000 
1966 Nl5,568,000 1972 N95,104,000 
1967 N42,560,000 1973 126,260,000 
1968 N28,392,000 1974 154,765,000 
1975 297,869,000 
1976 441,700,000 
Sources: Economic and Financial Review, Vol. 15, No. 1 (June, 1977); 
F.O.S., Annual Abstracts of Statistics (Lagos, 1978). 
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It can be seen from Table 2 above that although there was growth in 
the value of food imports in both the 1960s and 1970s, the latter decade 
registered a higher annual growth. Besides, output from the domestic food 
sector was steadier in the 1960s than in the 1970s when agriculture 
generally was neglected. This crisis which necessitated the importation 
of food could also be seen in the falling contribution of agriculture to 
the Gross Domestic Product. From 1960 agriculture declined as a 
percentage of the G.D.P., from 63.4 percent in 1960 to 23.4 percent in 
1975. 
Table 3 
THE STRUCTURE OF AGRICULTURAL EARNINGS IN NIGERIA 1960-1975 (IN MILLIONS) 
Year 1974-1975 Prices Agricultural % of G.D.P. 
G.D.P. Component of G.D.P. 
1960 2,244,6 1,423.8 63.4 
1961 2,373.4 1,465.2 61.7 
1962 2,630.8 1,609.6 61.2 
1963 2,806.4 1,675.0 59.7 
1964 2,914.0 1,678.0 57. 6 
1965 3,080.6 1,691.8 54. 9 
1966 3,210. 1,784.4 55.6 
1967 3,051.8 1,713.0 56.1 
1968 3,140.8 1,726.0 55.0 
1969 3,278.2 1.743.0 53.2 
1970 3,485.8 1,787.4 51.3 
1971 9,442.1 3,399.7 36.0 
1972 11,177.9 3,575.3 32.0 
1973 11,993.1 3,351.8 27.9 
1974 13,135.5 3,246.51 24.7 
1975 14,410.7 3,372.7 23.4 
Source: F.O.S. (Lagos Annual Abstracts of Statistics in Survey 
of Nigerian Economy, Table 3.1) 
Generally, the agricultural sector recorded poor growth rates over 
the past twenty years. This was in spite of general annual growth rate of 
4.8 percent in the economy.4 In less than a decade, agriculture's share 
of gross domestic product (GDP) declined from roughly one-half in the 
early 1960s to less than 30 percent in the 1970s, while its erstwhile 





























Source: Nigerian Gross Domestic Product and Allied Macro - Aggregates 
1973/1974-1981, Vol. 1 No. 1 (April, 1982), Federal Office of 
Statistics, Lagos, Nigeria. 
The general pattern in the 1970s therefore was a sluggish growth in 
agricultural output. This led to massive importation of food as a 
temporary measure, while it necessitated a systematic government response 
in search of a solution. To compound this problem, improved medical care, 
made possible by earnings from the then booming petroleum industry, 
accelerated population growth. Thus, as food supply from the domestic 
source declined, the population growth rate kept going up. This led to 
more demand for food. Even though temporary, this demand was met by 
earnings from the petroleum industry, thus avoiding serious social 
upheaval. As earnings from this sector grew, government and individuals 
did not worry much about the monstrous picture presented by the supply 
and demand equation of the food situation. 
To illustrate this population growth let us examine the annual change 
in population of the ten northern states which together could be 
considered as the grainary of Nigeria. In these states, from 1963 to 
1979, population grew from 29,807,000 to 44,169,000. This was a total 
growth of 44.8 percent This represents an average annual growth rate of 
2.8 percent over a period of sixteen years. At the time this was 
registered, there was stagnation or decline in food production from the 
domestic scene. In Nigeria generally, while the population growth index 
increased at an annual compound rate of 5.2 percent between 1960 and 
1974, that of food production registered a growth rate of only 2.5 
percent.5 Food supply growth rate was therefore almost 2 percent below 
the population rate. 
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Table 5 
POPULATION GROWTH IN TEN OF THE NORTHERN STATES 1963 - 1979 
State 1963 1977 1978 1979 
Bauchi 2,431,000 3,421,000 3,508,000 3,597,000 
Benue 2,427,000 3,415,000 3,502,000 3,591,000 
Borno 2,997,000 4,218,000 4,345,000 4,475,000 
Gongola 2,605,000 3,666,000 3,759,000 3,854,000 
Kaduna 4,098,000 5,768,000 5,913,000 6,063,000 
Kano 5,775,000 8,127,000 8,332,000 8,544,000 
Kwara 1,714,000 2,413,000 2,474,000 2,537.000 
Niger 1,194,000 1,681,000 1,724,000 1,767,000 
Plateau 2,027,000 2,852,000 2,924,000 2,996,000 
Sokoto 4,539,000 6,387,000 6,549,000 6,745,000 
Total 29,807,000 41,948,000 43,030,000 44,169,000 
Average annual growth rate: 2.9% 2.57% 2.6% 
Source: Digest of Statistics Vol. 27 December, 1979 
Federal Office of Statistics, Lagos, 1979. 
The picture presented above forced the federal government to import 
food (mainly rice) as an immediate way of averting the political 
instability which goes with food shortages. As I have said earlier, as 
long as the hard currency could be earned from other sources to foot the 
food import bills, it was all well and good. So massive was the import of 
food in the 1970s that the value in 1978 reached its all time height of 
Nl,108,662 million. In 1981, Nigeria imported half a million tonnes of 
rice alone.6 














Source: Federal Government of Nigeria, Report on the Nigeria Economic 
and Statistical Review (Lagos, 1983) p. 21. 
With the changing situation in the world oil market, however, from the 
mid-1970s, it became more and more difficult for Nigeria to import food. 
This was especially true because of other development projects which also 
need a foreign exchange component. Nigeria was then compelled to explore 
alternative solutions to the food problems of the country. 
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Some Causes of the Food Crisis 
Before examining the responses of the government to this 
rather frightening picture, let us consider briefly some of the causes of 
the food crisis. Several factors are responsible for Nigeria's food prob-
lems. While some of these are man-made, others are natural forces such as 
drought and other climate-related factors, and insect visitations. The 
man-made factors include policy tools and investment in agriculture, 
agricultural technology, and land tenure, etc •• 
During the pre-1970 era, food supply did not pose a serious 
problem for Nigeria. As mentioned earlier, the food component of imports 
was very low and mainly composed of exotic food items. This was the case 
primarily because agricultural production was subsistence production, 
done by small family units. These peasant farmers who tilled the soil and 
who constituted a high percentage of the labour force, lived in villages 
where their labor was invested in agriculture. 
As the 1970s set in, however, this pattern started to change 
for the worse. The early 1970s' oil boom brought with it many factors 
which attracted the available labour force from agriculture into the 
urban areas, where the expanding urban sectors provided many alternatives 
to agriculture. To the youths, additional attractions in the urban 
centers are the numerous social facilities and opportunities which are 
lacking in the rural areas. As Peter Lloyd says, "Most immigrants see 
their city homes as an important improvement upon their rural ones; 
frequently they have water nearby, and electricity, clinics and schools 
are not too distant. Most important, however, is their perception of the 



















NIGERIA: ESTIMATED POPULATION BY RURAL/URBAN DISTRIBUTION 
Urban Population 



































Rural Labour Force 

















Source: Extracted from Olayide, Economic Survey of Nigeria, Table 2.2. 
8 
The combination of these factors led to a negative rural-urban 
migration pattern. It is this realization that compelled the government 
to formulate commodity price policies which were favourable to primary 
products and to pursue more meaningful rural development policies. But 
this only appealed to the cash crop producer at more or less the total 
disregard of subsistence crops.8 Thus the supposed curative measure of 
the government to fix higher prices for agricultural products as an 
incentive for the producers to remain on the land, did not address, let 
alone solve, the problem of food production. In fact, it is argued here 
that such a policy distorted the pattern of investment in agriculture in 
favour of cash crops more than food crop production. In spite of such 
measures by the government, therefore, food production at best remained 
stagnant. 
Another explanation for this phenomenon is the disparity between 
population growth and food production. In Africa generally in the 1960s 
most countries' production kept pace with population growth. Except in a 
handful of them, population growth outpaced food production in the 1970s. 
So we have a declining or stagnating per capita in food production in the 
bulk of them, Nigeria included. 
Research into methods of increasing agricultural productivity has 
until recently been wanting, and irrelevant, thus contributing to the 
problem. Until recently, the traditional staples such as sorghum, millet, 
cassava and yam have not benefited from systematic research to increase 
their production. Instead, research farms have geared their efforts more 
to crops such as rice and wheat which cannot be grown very economically 
in Nigeria. Substantial capital is needed to provide the necessary 
environment for the production of these crops and especially of the 
popular varieties in the country today. In addition to all these there 
are institutional problems such as agricultural policies, which need to 
be examined and seriously refocused to arrest the problem of food 
shortage. 
Compounding this problem are numerous other factors. These include 
importation of cheap food as aid or as government-subsidized imports. 
Over the 1955-1972 period, large publicly held grain stocks in the 
developed countries and heavy food aid shipments had created an 
environment in which some developing countries had little incentive to 
produce enough food and fertilizers for themselves. There have also been 
natural disasters such as the 1973 Sahel drought, which dealt a serious 
blow to Nigeria. Subsequently, the country has found it difficult to feed 
itself from its domestic resources. Recently also, Nigerian civil 
servants and policy makers have found the policy of food importation, 
even when there is no need for such, very profitable and hence they 
design food import policies. From the issuance of the import licenses to 
private importers to import food, especially rice, the bureaucrat can 
easily make millions of nairas in kickbacks. This was especially true of 
the period from late 1970s to 1983 when rice unnecessarily became very 
central to the existence of Nigeria as a nation. The award of import 
licenses for items like rice was a lucrative business. Even when that was 
not necessary and there were alternatives to rice within the domestic 
agricultural sector, rice importation became the most attractive polity 




The reactions of the government to this crisis situation, therefore, 
were of two types, short- and long-term. As a contingency plan, the 
government started to import grains such as rice and wheat both to arrest 
the food crisis situation and also to create avenues for bureaucrats to 
make money. This was done either directly, whereby the government or its 
agent was mandated to import these items, or by awarding licenses to 
chosen contractors to do that, This response cannot be a final solution 
to the problem and hardly solves the problem even temporarily. It is one 
thing to import these items and another to distribute them among consum-
ers at affordable prices, 9 Until such is done, then the bulk of the 
consumers (the urban workers) will still be starving and hence the 
problem of social unrest, which necessitates such response, still needs 
to be addressed. 
It is for this reason, among others, that recently the emphasis 
shifted to yet another approach to solve the problem. Thus millions of 
naira have been ploughed into one agricultural project or the other. In 
the fiscal year of 1981, for example, about Nl.162 billion was allocated 
to agriculture.10 Between the 1974-1975 and 1976-1977 fiscal years, the 
federal government, state governments and the World Bank spent a total of 
N42.6 million on Funtua, Gusau and Gombe Agricultural Development 
Projects alone.11 The current thinking in the official circles is 
centered around laying the necessary infrastructure to boost agricultural 
production in order to feed the nation. Accordingly, the Operation Feed 
the Nation of the Obasanjo regime and the Green Revolution of the Shagari 
government emerged. The Green Revolution Programme launched in April 1980 
has four salient goals: 
1) to improve and modernize small-scale farming. 
2) to improve large scale agriculture by co-operatives, 
private companies and individuals. 
3) to intensify and mechanize large-scale agriculture by 
government intervention and 
4) to effect methodological food conservation and distribution,12 
The overall objective is to make this country self-supporting in the 
main food staples by 1985 and from 1987 to enable export of the main cash 
crops to the world market,13 Even though unrealistic, these were the 
objectives on paper. To utilize the full capacity of food production 
resources of the country, it became necessary to explore other avenues 
through which double or triple cropping in a calendar year is possible 
and also the cropping of areas with very low rainfall or areas that 
suffer from perennial flooding through mechanized agricultural designs, 
This explains the emergence of River Basin Authorities. These are 
meant to develop water resources for food production, Thus by decree No. 
33 of 1973 the federal government established the Sokoto - Rima Basin 
Development Authority and the Chad Basin Development Authority. In 1974 
the Hadeja-Jamaare River Basin Development Authority followed suit. By 
the decree No, 25 of 1976 seven other river projects were commissioned 
and by decree No. 87 those river projects were brought together under one 
administration, the National Council on Green Revolution. This Council is 
supposed to (1) coordinate the activities of all ministries and organiza-
tions that have a bearing on agricultural production, processing, market-
ing and research, (2) give general directives to the Ministries of 
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Agriculture and Water Resources on issues relating to the development of 
the agricultural sector, and (3) monitor the activites of the federal 
Ministries of Agriculture and Water Resources and assist these ministries 
in every way possible in their pursuit of the goal of self-sufficiency in 
agricultural production,l4 
In the latter case, Young Farmers Clubs have been encouraged, These 
clubs advise and encourage the rural youths to appreciate the value of 
farming as a sound occupation as well as inculcating in them the sense of 
self-reliance. By l98l there were seventy-two of both open and school 
clubs with a total number of l344 members in Niger State alone,lS 
In the same vein, through the Green Revolution scheme, the government 
was supposed to assist in improving peasants' methods of production 
through agricultural extension and research liaison services. The 
resultant research institutes were supposed to educate local farmers 
about the recent discoveries in farm production. These institutes, at 
least on paper, have radio and television programs where farm problems 
are raised and discussed. Where there is a new agricultural discovery, 
such is supposed to be translated into various languages, in pictorial 
forms as well as prctical demonstrations, on demonstration farms for 
farmers to copy, 
The realization of the importance of research as a means of finding 
solutions to low productivity in agriculture, and hence to improve the 
production, goes back to the colonial era. In 1953, realizing the need to 
develop new and improved varieties of rice with accompanying economically 
profitable production packages, as well as identifying and eliminating 
constraints to high yields on Nigerian rice farms, the federal govern-
ment's Rice Research Station was established at Badeggi in Niger State. 
This station and others charged with researching into cereals, make up 
the National Cereals Research Institute (NCRI). The institute coordinates 
the activities of the various cereals research centers spread all over 
the country, In Imo State, for example, there is the Bendel Institute, 
which investigates forest zone irrigation of lowland rice production, In 
Borno State there is the Ngala arid zone irrigation of lowlands for rice 
production; the Shendam project in Plateau State for savanah zone 
irrigation of lowland rice. Others include Warri in Bendel State for 
mangrove swamp rice, Fedozlighi in Niger State for iron foxie soil 
irrigation lowland rice, and Birnin Kebbi in Sokoto State for floating 
rice production.l6 One important achievement of the center in Niger 
State is newly developed short-duration, high-yielding, disease-
resistant varieties (FAROX 234-l and FAROX 230-l), From the same station, 
high yield seeds are distributed among the river basin development 
authorities, state ministries of agriculture, and the national seed 
service, for multiplication and distribution among farmers. 
Government has also always provided incentives for investment in 
agriculture as a means of tackling the problem of food shortage, These 
incentives range from providing certain basic services to the sectors, to 
price policies deemed fit to encourage farmers and others to invest more 
in agriculture. Thinking that the problem of food production centered 
around commodity prices in agriculture during the l970s and up till 
today, governments of Nigeria have annually revised prices of 
agricultural products upwardly, In recent times for example, the price of 
cocoa rose from Nl,200 per tonne during the 1979/80 buying season to 
Nl,300 during the l980/8l season; that of millet rose from N220 per tonne 
ll 
during the 1979/80 to N231 during the 1981/82 season; rice rose from N570 
per tonne during the 1979/80 buying season to N596 per tonne during the 
1981/82 season.17 
Other incentives provided by the government include the distribution 
of fertilizer to farmers, the distribution of improved and high-yielding 
seeds, and the renting of tractors to farmers. All of these were heavily 
subsidized by the government. Through the Green Revolution scheme, the 
government, at least on paper, sold farm implements to farmers at 50 
percent subsidy. In principle, it was supposed to pay compensation on 
land cleared to grow maize, rice and or sorghum. Every assisted farmer 
was encouraged to clear ten hectares of land, at N500 for each hectare, 
to be paid by the government. Fiscal incentives were, at least on paper, 
given to companies wishing to go into large-scale agricultural enter-
prises. Such included tax relief for five years for pioneer enterprises, 
duty-free importation of farm equipments, and provision for carrying 
forward losses. Still in pursuit of the objective of self-sufficiency in 
food supply, even resident investors were allowed to go into partnership 
with Commodity Board, Grains Board, production companies and state 
governments' development cooperatives to invest in agricultural produc-
tion. This was a new development in the Nigerian economy. Throughout the 
colonial era, the government would not allow the participation of resi-
dent investors in agricultural production because of the sensitive nature 
of land issues. Here, because of the desperate state of affairs in the 
agricultural sector, the government allowed it in spite of the potential 
dangers of the emergence of expatriate-owned enclave plantation economy. 
Other tax incentives include the zero rating of import duty in all 
raw material for the manufacture of livestock feeds and on all agricul-
tural machines including those for food and agricultural processing. The 
government also agrees in principle to give an investment allowance of 10 
percent, in addition to the existing capital allowance on agricultural 
equipment, to farmers. 
The government has also given some guidelines to commercial banks on 
their lending to the various sectors of the economy. In order to provide 
the necessary financial backing for agriculture, the government made it 
part of its monetary policy in the 1970s to assign specific allocation of 
bank credit facilities to agriculture. During fiscal years 1972/73 to 
1974/75 for example, the government directed commercial banks that 4 
percent out of 45 percent of their deposits allotted to the production 
sector should be invested in agriculture. In 1975/76 to 1977 /78 fiscal 
year, the allocation of commercial bank lending to agriculture was 
increased from 4 percent to 6 percent out of a total of 48 percent 
allotted to the production sector. This further went up to 9 percent in 
1979/80 fiscal year. In 1979/80 monetary measures, the government 
instructed all commercial banks to establish agricultural loans depart-
ments .18 
An important measure taken by the government along this line was the 
establishment of the Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme (ACGS) in 1977. 
This was a joint venture between the federal government with a 60 percent 
share and the Central Bank of Nigeria with a 40 percent share. This bank 
started with a working capital of NlOO million which was to be used as a 
cushion to commercial banks against defaulting among farmers who borrowed 
from them. Seventy-five percent of such loans to farmers were to be guar-
anteed by this bank while the farmers provided the remaining 25 percent. 
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In a published report by the ACGS, in 1978 only Nll.3 million was loaned 
to farmers. This covered only 341 projects. The total lending under the 
scheme went up to N33.6 million in 1979. 
In spite of such banking arrangements, however, food production still 
lags far behind demand. This is partially due to the use to which these 
loans were put by the borrowers, among other reasons. In a research done 
in 1981 by Jon Madeley, very little of the loans acquired by farmers 
actually went into agricultural production.19 The little that is 
ploughed into agricultural production mainly went into the production of 
cash crops and livestock. Livestock alone took 70.1 percent of the total 
guaranteed loans in 1981, while in the previous year it was 68.1 percent 
of the total loan.20 
Sectoral Agricultural Loans in Nigeria 1981-1983 
Year Poultry Cattle Grains 
1981 N7 million N2 million N3 million 
1982 Nll million N0.2 million N2 million 
1983 Nll million NO. 5 million N3 million 
Source: Central Bank Report on the Economy in The Guardian (May 
1984), p. 16. 
Thus, in spite of the attractive size of the loans given to farmers, 
food (grains) production is still low, thus causing serious problems. It 
should be pointed out here that not all of the remaining 29 percent of 
the total loans in 1981 (31% of 1980) went into food production. Farmers 
ploughed some of this into other activities such as marrying more wives, 
buying things like bicycles or motorcycles etc. It can be seen then, that 
out of the total loan fund, very little went into the production of food 
crops. 
Having examined governments' policy tools, let us now examine its 
direct involvement in agriculture to solve this problem. In this respect, 
let us examine the activities of the government projects with which it 
intends to solve the problem of food shortage. The National Grains Pro-
duction Board (NGPD) which is an arm of the Green Revolution Programme, 
has acquired 400 hectares of land in thirteen states in the country. With 
these, the government gets directly involved in the process of agricul-
tural production. 
The various River Basin Development Authorities, which are government 
projects, have also come into operation. To assess the success of poten-
tials of these projects as a way of solving the problem of food in 
Nigeria, I will examine the output figures of the Rima Basin Authority 
located in Sokoto State, the Chad Basin Authority and the Upper Benue 
Basin Authority. 
The original idea was to take two of the oldest projects (Chad and 
Rima) and two new ones (Upper Benue and Hadeja - Jamaare projects). 
However, due to lack of data on the latter, I am compelled to examine 
only three. It is assumed here that on the basis of this examinarion we 
can see the extent to which and the cost at which these projects can 
solve the problems for which they are designed. 
The output of the River Basin Development Authorities (RBDA) has so 
far been impressive. Rice production in Chad basin, for example, 
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increased from 11,227 tonnes in 1980 to 11,736 tonnes in 1981, while 
maize production during the same period rose from 680 tonnes to 2031 
tonnes. Sokoto Rima Basin Authority also reported an increase of 13.8 
percent in wheat production in 1981 above the 900 tonnes of 1980.21 A 
similar picture is presented in Upper Benne Project. In 1980, total 
grains production was 341.1 tonnes. In 1981 this rose to 7,704 tonnes and 
18,220 tonnes in 1982.22 In the Chad Basin, the South Chad Irrigation 
project shows significant annual increase in the production of wheat and 
rice since it went into production. 
ANNUAL OUTPUT FROM THE SOUTH CHAD IRRIGATION PROJECTS IN TONNES 
Crops 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Wheat 2000 2200 8000 16000 
Rice 2120 2880 14000 28000 
Source: Chad Basin Development Authoriti Performance Report 1975/82, 
Planning and Design Department, Maiduguri (June 1983). 
In the Rima Basin project in Sokoto, one sees the same picture. Wheat 
production on this project grew from 110 tonnes in 1979, to 240 tonnes in 
1980; 1051 tonnes in 1981 and to 2327 tonnes in 1983. These were all dry 
season production. During the rainy season when the dam's irrigation 
system is not used, rice production grew from 34 tonnes in 1979 to 6664 
tonnes in 1983. Similarly guinea corn production rose from 4 tonnes in 
1979 to 11,550 in 1983; maize production rose from 1.8 tonnes in 1979 to 
931 tonnes in 1983 and finally millet rose from 478 tonnes in 1979 to 
3862 tonnes in 1983.23 
From the above production figures, it is therefore clear that current 
trends in the production activities of the various projects are encour-
aging. Whether or not this pattern could be sustained and improved upon 
depends greatly on factors such as constant financial backing, efficient 
financial and project management, and a healthy relationship between the 
projects' administration and the farmers affected, efficient and judi-
cious utilization of the irrigated farmland. 
It should be pointed out at this juncture that it is too premature to 
determine whether or not these river projects, which are the most system-
atic long-term approach to the solution of the food crisis, would actually 
perform the necessary miracle. Many judgements have been passed in some 
of the Nigeria's newspapers. This manifests misconceptions of the nature 
of investments entailed in the River Projects. As I have said earlier, it 
is a capital-intensive investment whose results can be realized only 
after a certain gestation period. 
Having said this, from some discernable patterns both within the 
projects and the society at large, what is the future of the numerous 
River Basin Authorities? Are they likely eventually to solve the food 
crisis problem as stated in the decree which established them? These are 
questions that can hardly be answered now. What is clear, however, is 
that contrary to the rather ambitious objective of solving the problem by 
1985 and exporting food by 1987, Nigeria will continue to face the same 
problem for some years to come unless certain issues are addressed 
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seriously and constructively. This will include restructuring investment 
in agriculture and reorganizing the marketing of agricultural products, 
to discourage smuggling the little that is available in the domestic 
system when domestic demands are left unsatisfied. 
Problems and Prospects 
The success of the various River Basin Authorities would partially 
depend on a mutual realization and respect of each other's interest 
between the administration and the farmers whose farms have been taken up 
for the irrigation projects. This entails rehabilitating the farmers on 
sites close to the irrigation projects to avoid transport problems and 
social problems such as the Bakolori incident of 1979/80.24 It would 
also be necessary to realize that to achieve the objective of rural 
development and equitable income distribution, farmers should have access 
to the services given by the River Basin Authorities (RBA) and pay 
appropriately for them. Such services would include access to irrigated 
land, fertilizer, tractors to hire and other tertiary services on the 
project sites. At the same time, such should not be done in such a way 
that the RBA fails to generate revenue to maintain these services and to 
continue to provide them more cheaply and in larger volumes. 
This calls for a more profitable allocation of the irrigated land. 
Currently the arrangement seems to be that peasants have the right of 
lease on these project sites and pay a certain rent for a given piece of 
land. This, from what one of the general mangers told me in an interview, 
leaves the RBA with just enough land for pilot projects.25 In effect, 
the RBA in this arrangement is a demonstrator in extension service and a 
servicing department rather than also a revenue-generating venture. 
Because rents paid by farmers (if appropriately paid) are low, the RBA 
depended at the initial stage exclusively on the federal government and 
until today still depends heavily on this source of financing. This 
therefore means that in circumstances where the federal government cannot 
generate enough resources from its own sources, its allocation to the 
various projects will also drop irrespective of their commitments and 
development needs. With little revenue from rents collected from farmers 
and fluctuating federal subsidy, recurrent investment in the RBA will be 
inconsistent and hence so will the service. In severe situations, the 
revenue from the federal government could be so small that certain 
services will either have to be cut down drastically or completely 
abolished. From 1980-1983, in severe economic situation, this was the 
experience of the River Projects. 
The implication of this is, that there cannot be a permanent solution 
to the problem of food crisis in a circumstance such as the one discussed 
above. Anytime there is a decrease in funding, such is bound to be 
reflected in the provision of services crucial for production. Unless 
therefore there is constant and adequate funding over a reasonably long 
period of time to facilitate the accumulation of surplus grains and 
unless there is a review of land allocation and utilization on the 
irrigation sites, the problem of food shortage will still be with us in 
the foreseeable future. 
Given the present state of finance and revenue in Nigeria, the first 
proposal, i.e. constant and adequate funding over a period of time, might 
not be a good and certainly not a practical solution. In this circum-
stance, it becomes necessary to reallocate land within the irrigated land 
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to make the RBA not only a demonstrator of skills and administrator of 
services but a commercial producer to generate its own resources. The 
suggestion advanced here is to make the RBA profit-making ventures 
without necessarily killing private individual initiatives. Thus the RBA 
could divide their land into three, giving every plot equal treatment. 
One of such plots could be allocated to medium and large scale farmers 
while the second to small land holders (peasants) and the last kept for 
the use of the various River Development Authorities. From such an 
arrangement, while the RBA generates revenue from their commercial 
farming, they also collect rents and taxes on their leases to private 
farmers. With such revenue the RBA's financial ability to continue to 
render the necessary services for constant increase in agricultural 
output is enhanced and could be assured. Hence their reliance on one 
major source of revenue (the federal government) would be less, making it 
possible for them to continue operating normally even when government 
revenue declines, This approach will take care of yet another serious 
problem - the disappearance of peasants and the emergence of large-scale 
agriculture businessmen. 
This is the most serious danger posed by the land allocation and 
utilization on the irrigation sites today. Concerned citizens of Nigeria 
have constantly drawn the attention of the government to this danger. 
People like Bala Y. Usman consider the RBA' s as an opportunity for 
retired generals, permanent secretaries, politicians, captains and other 
influential citizens to enrich themselves at the expense of the 
peasants. 26 Similarly, current newspaper articles think of the RBA as 
being only for the rich and influential. As Victoria Ghomarai said, "what 
the Green Revolution (through the RBA) has succeeded in doing so far is 
that some very lucky Nigerians have cashed in on the contracts in the so 
called River Basin Authorities and the distributions of fertilizers to 
make millions of naira for themselves. "27 Even though we cannot totally 
take such assertions at their face value, they clearly point to the 
danger in the distribution of the benefits accrued to these projects 
among Nigerians, This danger does not need to be emphasized here. 
Caution should therefore be exercised to avert this danger, Failure 
to do this has some serious repercussions, In the first place, it could 
lead to the crystallization of a destructive system where the difference 
between the poor and the rich increases and becomes dangerously threat-
ening to the peace and stability of the nation, Needless to say, such an 
atmosphere does not provide the necessary tranquility for socio-economic 
development.28 Furthermore if the RBA fails here, their objectives of 
rural development and equitable distribution of income would have been 
defeated. Thus a more realistic and constructive reexamination of the 
land allocation and utilization on the project sites along with the 
suggestions made earlier is a pre-requisite to the achievement of the 
goals of the projects. 
There is also a need for government intervention to reshape the 
present pattern of investment in agriculture, This measure is parti-
cularly called for because of government's role in guaranteeing the 
various loans from the commercial banks for agricultural activities 
through the Central Bank. As has been mentioned earlier, most of the 
loans received by individuals for agriculture and guaranteed by the 
government through its Agricultural Guarantee Loan Scheme, is ploughed 
into livestock and economic tree production. The lack of these are not 
the genesis of Nigeria's food crisis, even though they contribute to it, 
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The shortage which affects the daily life of the ordinary Nigerian is not 
the shortage of meat and fruits but the shortage of grains which consti-
tute a lion's share of their daily diet. This being the case, govern-
ment's monetary policy on commercial bank lending should reflect the need 
to plough more of the loans acquired into cereals production. This 
intervention could be done by more detailed stipulations and restrictive 
measures on loan utilization within the agricultural sector. It could be 
said, for instance, of the 10 percent or whatever total of commercial 
banks loans going to agriculture, a high percentage of that should go 
into cereal production. Similarly the government could restructure its 
incentives to farmers in such a way that farmers are attracted more to 
produce grains than other agricultural products. It should be mentioned 
here, that the policy restructuring entailed in this exercise should not 
be done at the expense of the livestock and other sub-sectors of agri-
culture. As much as possible, these sub-sectors should be encouraged 
simultaneously. 
Unless such measures are taken, the millions of naira loans given out 
every year by both government and cooperative and commercial banks will 
be invested in production processes which are peripheral to the main 
problem facing the country. The result will be the continuation of the 
situation as it is and the heightening of inflation. The loans given for 
agriculture, but which are not exclusively used for that purpose, add to 
the liquidity within the system. Unless there is corresponding or 
appropriate increase in the supply of agricultural produce for which they 
are intended, the only way of keeping the escalating prices down would be 
to import the needed surplus. This can only be possible if the foreign 
exchange component is available, otherwise the little that is available 
from the domestic sources will attract high prices, thus making them 
unaffordable to most people. This is what obtains in Nigeria today when 
the country finds it more and more difficult to import these scarce food 
items. Invariably, therefore, there is a need to examine once more 
government's restrictive monetary policy on bank lending to agriculture. 
The problem of appropriate technology also casts a shadow on the 
future of the RBA and hence their ability to provide a solution to the 
problem of food shortage in Nigeria. Right from the onset, Nigeria's 
choice of technology for the irrigation scheme leaves a lot to be 
desired, given the general social and economic infrastructure in the 
country. Socially the level of literacy which can enable the peasant to 
use the irrigation system to yield high returns, is very low or non-
existent. To operate the rather expensive surface sprinklers, which is 
the irrigation mechanism used on the Bakolori site, for example, could be 
difficult for an illiterate farmer. He is therefore left at the mercy of 
some "expert" to operate this. Where the so-called "expert" is not dedi-
cated and not well trained, this could pose a serious danger to farm-
lands. Acres of such lands could be ruined either out of irresponsibility 
or ignorance on the side of the "expert."29 
It is to avoid such predicaments caused by poor manpower that all of 
the RBAs have mounted appropriate staff development schemes and have 
established field extension services to advise farmers. From its staff 
training program for example, the Chad River Basin Authority has produced 
certified 136 people in agriculture and animal husbandary, fisheries and 
forestry, 102 with ordinary National Diploma, 47 with Higher National 
Diploma; 2 with first degree and one with post-graduate degree. 
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The ability of such staff to cater successfully for a multi-million 
naira project involving hundreds of thousands of acres of land, however, 
still leaves a lot to be desired. This, therefore, calls for more and 
fast paying efforts to increase the manpower component of the RBAs if 
they are to continue to solve the problem of food crisis, The picture is 
poorer in the operation of the engineering section. In this category, as 
of June, 1983 there were 6 certified personnel, 8 with ordinary diploma, 
five with Higher National Diploma, and none with a first or post-graduate 
degree,30 
An additional dimension to the problem of technology on these 
projects is their exclusive reliance on power supply. The RBAs need 
electricity to generate the sprinklers. Although this power is generated 
from hydroelectric sources, its continuous financial demand to keep the 
machines working is an irritating expense in a financial crisis situa-
tion, Where such demands cannot be met, it means farms may not be irri-
gated unless there is an alternative. Given the noncultural nature of the 
export sector which is dominated by the petroleum industry, such a tech-
nology is not the best suited for these projects. It may be difficult if 
not impossible to suggest a change of technology, Nevertheless, it should 
be pointed out that given such a technology and the cases surrounding it, 
one's hope for the RBAs to solve the problem of food shortage cannot be 
very high. Its financial demand either for capital or recurrent activi-
ties is very high and unless there is a viable domestic source of revenue 
to finance it continuously, reliance on RBAs to deliver the goods cannot 
be absolute, 
In the foregoing paragraphs, the centrality of finance in the success 
of the RBA has been emphasized again and again. This is because the RBAs 
are capital-'intensive projects and unless there is the required finance 
to keep them in operation the objectives for which they are designed can 
hardly be realized. One needs capital, for example, to compensate the 
farmers and rehabilitate them and to construct the dams and the irriga-
tion canals. Finance is also needed for the pilot schemes which demon-
strate new ideas and techniques of production to farmers. Finance 
therefore is very central and given recent trends in the development of 
Nigeria's economy and the continued decline in foreign exchange earnings, 
one cannot help being sceptical about the much exaggerated hope expressed 
by politicians in the success of the RBA projects, This is further com-
pounded by the rather inefficient financial management of such public 
projects in Nigeria's economy generally,31 
Another issue which needs to be addressed is the correlation between 
the food shortage and population growth, The present lack of a national 
population policy has serious implications for the problem of food 
shortage in Nigeria today. Even in a situation where there is an appre-
ciable growth in output from the agricultural sector, there could still 
be food shortage if such a growth in output lags behind population growth 
rate. The danger of population growth is magnified where such growth is 
not correlated with growth in domestic supply of foodstuffs to feed the 
new mouths, Hence Nigeria could plough millions into agricultural 
projects every year, yet as long as nothing is done about the rate at 
which the population grows, there are always going to be food problems, 
There are still more issues which need to be highlighted in relation 
to this subject matter, Nevertheless, suffice it to say that those 
mentioned here are crucial to the problem and hence the paramountcy given 
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to them. It should be mentioned at this juncture that the elimination of 
any of the problems raised above does not and cannot conclusively solve 
the problem of food shortage. The approach must be integrational. As much 
as possible, whosoever addresses the problem should consider the inter-
relatedness of these factors and therefore attack the problem multi-
dimensionally. This may not be from all of the angles mentioned above, 
but a least from the crucial ones - finance, technology and population. 
Finally, it is my hope that this paper will at least generate fruitful 
discussions on this important issue which seriously threatens the destiny 
of Black Africa's biggest country. 
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